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Introduction and Motivation
When premiums are mandated to be independent of risk, competitive health insurers have an incentive to select clients whose future expected health care expenditure does not exceed their contribution. This consideration has induced secondary regulation in the guise of risk adjustment (RA) schemes. Basically, RA makes insurers with an above-average share of favorable risks pay into a fund, whose proceeds are used to cross-subsidize those insurers with many unfavorable risks. The design of an optimal RA formula is a widely discussed topic (see for example Jack [2006] , Glazer This contribution focuses on this issue through a case study from Switzerland, a country that relies on competitive health insurance in a way similar to the United States. A RA scheme was introduced in 1996, using the two criteria age and gender only. Effective 2012, the RA formula will include a third indicator of high risk, viz. "Hospitalization of more than three days or living in a nursing home during the previous year" (see Spycher [2000] ). A more sophisticated version known as "Principal Inpatient Diagnostic Cost Groups (PIPDCG)" has been in use with US Medicare (see Ingber [2000] ).
1 Using previous hospitalization as a risk adjuster has recommendable features in that it (1) has significant predictive power (see Beck [2004] and Holly et al. [2003] ),
(2) relates to a previous period so does not undermine insurers' effort at controlling health care cost, (3) is not easily manipulated, and (4) can be measured at little administrative expense. The benefit of fine tuning RA consists in the reduction of risk-selection efforts by health insurers. However, there may also be disadvantages (for an explicit analysis of advantages and disadvantages of this criterion in the case of Medicare, see Pope et al. [2000] ).
1
There are three main differences between the US and Swiss version: (a) Whereas PIPDCG categories take into consideration the severity of a case, the Swiss criterion is binary, distinguishing only hospitalization from no hospitalization. (b) To avoid gaming by health plans, Medicare RA counts stays of at least two days. Swiss RA counts stays of at least four days. (c) Whereas maternity stays count in PIPDCG, the Swiss formula excludes the stay because Beck [2004] found no significantly higher costs following maternity. (neglecting administrative expense for simplicity), and RA a,g the payment to the RA scheme. The premium paid by a specific low risk i whose cost are under average for the specific age-gender cell (a, g) then amounts tō
Therefore, this particular low risk bears a cross-subsidy in favor of high risks consisting of two components. The first component is the difference between average HCE of group (a, g) and the individuals expected HCE EL i ; the second, the contribution to the RA scheme, to be paid by the insurer. The sum of the two will be referred to as cross-subsidization (CS) values. As to the second component, the current Swiss RA formula has only two criteria, age and gender. 
withL (=P in eq. (1) since administrative expense is neglected) denoting average health care expenditure (HCE) in the canton's population as a whole.
2
Rather than the consumer's, the insurer's point of view is adopted now. Thus, the insurer has to contribute to the RA fund for favorable risks (L a,g <L). The RA fund uses the proceeds to cover the deficits generated by unfavorable risks (L a,g >L). Average HCE of a canton's population,L, is calculated as follows,
where n a,g represents the number of individuals in cell (a, g). An insurer's total payment into/from the RA fund depends on the composition of its insured, (k=1,..., 26 denotes canton),
An insurer receives payments if V >0 and contributes to risk adjustment if V <0. 
The subscript s is equal to 1 if a hospital stay in the previous year exceeds three days and otherwise 0. Average HCE,L a,g,s,k , of the respective RA cell now has to be calculated for 60 instead of 30 groups, whileL remains the same.
Data
For calculating the RA a,g,s,k in eq. (4) for a given health insurer, the cellspecific averagesL a,g,s,k must be known. Since RA a,g,s,k is not published by 
Checking Simulated RA Payments
First, the data provided by the three large health insurers had to be checked for representativeness using the current RA formula. The values for RA a,g were calculated for all 30 cells along with their standard errors according to the methodology described in Section 2.1 and compared with the official nationwide values. The insurers on average pay for women aged 19 to 25 more than CHF 1,700 per year (see Table 1 in the Appendix). Conversely, they receive payment for over 90 year old women to the tune of some CHF 8,600. While the fit is good in general, RA contributions by the three insurers are lower than the official figures from age 61 on.
Based on the evidence, one can conclude that the three major health insurers sampled are sufficiently representative of the Swiss population to enable a simulation of the new RA formula based on their data. This conclusion is also supported by the fact that one of the three is a net recipient of payments from the RA scheme, one breaks even, and one is a net contributor to the scheme. Also note that according to 3 Simulating the Impacts of the New
RA Formula
In this section, estimated RA values with the new RA formula including hospitalization during the previous year are presented first. Then, the impacts of the regulatory fine-tuning on health insurer A in terms of financial burden and choice of strategy are shown.
Risk Adjustment with the New Criterion
Official RA values grouped according to the additional criterion, "Hospitalization during the previous year" are not available. between those without a hospital stay in the previous year to shrink considerably beyond age 70. Conversely, it causes persons with a hospital stay to be cross-subsidized regardless of age or gender. Second, and related to this, the usual age profile ceases to exist. For instance, hospitalized women in the 19 to 25 age group benefit more than the three next older groups, and at the high end, it is the aged 86 to 90 rather than the oldest that benefit most. Among men, the age profile becomes almost level beyond age 70. Third, the per capita amounts now are higher, pointing to a substantial increase in the volume of cross-subsidization.
Impacts on Risk Adjustment Payments by Health Insurer A
The consequences of adding the new risk adjuster "hospitalization" for health • Payments of A into the RA scheme increase in all cantons. In some, A even turns from receiver into payer, such as in the cantons of Vaud (VD) and Geneva (GE). The biggest absolute increase occurs in the canton of Berne (BE). Here, payments increase by CHF 24 mn., which corresponds to a relative increase of 190 percent over the actual 2005 value.
• 
Impact on Risk Management
It is unlikely that an insurer confronted with the changes described in the preceding sections can continue with its risk management (RM) strategy unchanged. The two main alternatives revolve around the two principal activities of an insurer, viz. underwriting and capital investment. Starting with the latter, the insurer could seek offsetting returns on capital investments. However, in the present state of the economy this is very difficult. In addition, capital market theory predicts that higher expected returns can only be achieved in return for more risk once the efficient frontier has been reached, a consequence that is not easily accepted by a regulator of social health insurance. The second possibility is to increase margins from underwriting either by increasing net premiums or reducing claims. Swiss statutory health insurers have to pay by law for all services included in the official list of benefits, with most prices regulated. Therefore, it is not possible to decrease insurance claims significantly.
Liabilities arising from underwriting can be reduced by purchasing reinsurance;
however, up to present reinsurers have not been providing coverage against RA liabilities. This leaves an increase of premiums net of RA payments as the likely RM response. Since premiums are fixed by community rating regulation, lowering payments into the RA scheme becomes the preferred alternative.
One way to achieve this objective is to enroll more unfavorable risks, in particular persons who were hospitalized during the previous year. This is the adjustment the new RA formula was designed to bring about. The challenge to the insurer's RM now becomes to come up with more hospitalizations without incurring much additional cost. Recall that a hospitalization counts as soon as it exceeds three days. When segmenting A's HCE function according to length of stay in the hospital during the previous year, it turns out that patients with four days do not cost significantly more than those with three.
Therefore, A has to weigh the once-and-for-all extra cost of a hospital day against the extra contribution from the RA scheme, which may amount to several thousand CHF (see Table 1 of the Appendix).
The possible reduction of RA payments can be estimated as follows. While There are lessons to be learned for other countries who impose community rating on competitive health insurers, among them, the United States. First, it is practically impossible to fully neutralize insurers' risk selection incentive through an RA scheme, and be it only due to their different rates of discount in estimating the present value of the benefits and costs associated with risk selection. Second, perfecting the RA formula can have unintended side effects at the level of an individual insurer that go as far as jeopardizing its economic survival in spite of innovative effort. In the case studied here, the insurer is even punished for its innovative commitment to Managed Care. Finally, the threat of survival may well trigger adjustments in RM strategy that cause an efficiency loss to the economy as a whole.
There is an alternative that avoids the regulatory spiral described here. Health insurers could be simply permitted to charge premiums according to estimated risk. With sufficient pressure of competition, this would boil down to "price equal to expected marginal cost" since expected future health care expenditure importantly reflects the insurer's cost of enrolling an additional customer.
Wealthy individuals can pay a high risk-based premium out of their own means.
The same is true of low-income individuals who are favorable risks. The problematic group are low-income individuals who are unfavorable risks. They can be entitled to an earmarked subsidy that kicks in as soon as their premium exceeds a certain percentage of their income (see Zweifel and Breuer [2006] ).
In fact, the new law on health insurance of 2004 introduced such a targeted subsidy in Switzerland -without however lifting the premium regulation introduced in 1911. The consequence is an avoidable fine tuning of health insurance regulation with its unhealthy impacts not only on an individual insurer but the economy as a whole. 
